/srv/irclogs.ubuntu.com/2021/08/02/#ubuntu-server.txt

=== JanC_ is now known as JanC
lordievaderGood morning06:21
=== frickler_ is now known as frickler
TJ-anyone think of a relatively painless way to have a server's LUKS-encrypted /boot/ content mirrored to another, TFTP, server, such that grub/kernel updates get replicated from the host to the remote so that this host can also do TFTP boot over the network - looking at using DRDB with onw half of the mirror on the localhost and the other on the TFTP server13:53
TJ-I *think* localhost would have to do e.g. /dev/sda3 > LUKS > DRDB > ext4 > /boot/ rather than /dev/sda3 > LUKS >ext4 > /boot/13:54
sdezielTJ-: I'd probably use DRBD too but I don't know how easy it is to wire it into the boot logic14:26
TJ-it doesn't need to be. it just needs to be there when the OS is running so any updates get written to the TFTP server as well14:26
TJ-I'm almost finished configuring it now; will test shortly14:26
sdezielTJ-: a possible alternative would be mdadm raid1 with a NBD disk as the mirror in (write-mostly)14:26
TJ-the idea is for a low power Raspi battery-backed survives a site power outage. The APU2 gateway (x86) doesn't and is LUKS encrypted and would require serial console to GRUB to unlock /boot/ ... the aim is to set the system to try a PXE boot first, and if a PXE server responds, then it'll boot over the network and not need GRUB unlocking.14:28
TJ-Raspi will monitor the state of the ethernet link between them and enable/disable dnsmasq when link goes down/up so it isn't always doing a TFTP boot14:29
TJ-so a regular APU2 reboot, with the switch remaining powered, won't cause raspi to start dnsmasq14:30
rbasakTJ-: this sounds awfully complicated and error-prone to me. Can you expand on the actual problem you're trying to solve here?14:34
TJ-rbasak: unlocking grub at boot time on an unattended gateway14:38
rbasakTJ-: what's your threat model?14:42
TJ-no gateway14:45
rbasakNo - I mean why LUKS and also providing a method to bypass it? What's your threat model that requires LUKS but permits the bypass?14:48
rbasakBecause there might be other solutions, but without understanding your threat model that leads you to that, it's difficult to suggest anything.14:48
TJ- literally, and figuratively. LUKS protects against there being no gateway (stolen). But device needs to be able to fully reboot since it is the gateway14:51
rbasakSo don't use LUKS then? I'm playing devil's advocate here. What's the difference? You're OK with providing automatic unlocking if something has not had a power outage? In that case, won't Mandos work?14:53
rbasakBenefit is that it's less hackery.14:53
TJ-LUKS is protecting sensitive info14:54
TJ-no, LUKS is applied at the bootloader stage14:54
rbasakLUKS is protecting nothing if you happily hand over everything needed to unlock it over the LAN!14:55
rbasakIf you consider "can get to the LAN" as "safe to unlock" under your threat model, then Mandos works without any less security.14:56
leftyfbTJ-: put the gateway on a UPS? ;)14:56
TJ-leftyfb: unfortunately not practical in this scenario14:57
TJ-Mandos doesn't protect against someone dropping a payload in the unencrypted /boot/ and collecting the data later. 14:58
rbasakNor does PXE booting first, where anyone on the LAN can MITM whatever they want.14:59
TJ-rbasak: but we'll know if there is any other device on the LAN, that isn't a problem. 15:00
rbasakTJ-: that's a brave assumption.15:02
rbasakA switch with some MAC filtering will bypass that.15:03
TJ-seems that drbd cannot handle link-local addresses, despite recommending not to route and only connect on a local segment!16:15
TJ-rbasak: these things are outside, on top of very tall telegraph poles. 16:19
TJ-strange, drbd Changelog says for 8.3 Improved IPv6: link local addresses. Kernel has 8.4.1116:43
TJ-Turns out there's a bug in drbd-utils - cannot handle "fe80::" style addresses - have to expand the :: fully dso "fe80:0:0:0:..." 18:24

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