=== benfrancis6 is now known as benfrancis === benfrancis0 is now known as benfrancis [06:22] morning [06:57] PR snapd#11845 closed: tests/main/nfs-support: be robust against umount failures [08:17] PR snapd#11834 closed: o/snapstate: exclude services from refresh app awareness hard running check [09:18] PR snapd#11847 opened: tests/main/interfaces-browser-support: verify jupyter notebooks access [11:23] PR snapd#11178 closed: tests: increase the memory on test minimal-smoke with secboot disabled [11:28] PR snapd#11848 opened: tests: revert lxd change to support nested lxd launch [13:13] PR snapd#11824 closed: interfaces/browser-support: allow editing of Jupyter notebooks in browsers [13:13] PR snapd#11847 closed: tests/main/interfaces-browser-support: verify jupyter notebooks access [14:33] PR snapcraft#3777 closed: parts: fix metadata extraction dirs [17:33] I have a question about snaps. I have found online that snaps are immutable but is there any protection to the rest of the machine? The reason I ask is I am trying to run a server service on ubuntu server and trying to see if it would be better to use, a container or a snap for security reasons? [17:34] or would it be best to write an apparmor profile for that service? [20:40] tacomaster: hi! When you launch a snap, a container is created: not only AppArmor confines the process, but also we use seccomp, cgroups, and mount namespaces to isolate the snap from the rest of the machine [20:41] tacomaster: the more interface you connect in the snap, the more "holes" we drill in the container [20:41] *interfaces [21:13] tacomaster, adding to what mardy said, every single snap undergoes an autmatic review during upload. there are interfaces that are harmless (like "audio-playback") when your snap connects them, and there are more privileged ones (i.e. "network-setup-control") ... snaps that use the higher privileged ones need to pass a manual review by the security team ... if you look at the "store-requests" category at forum.snapcraft.io you cn find them all ...